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INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years ago, the city of San Francisco declared itself
a "City of Refuge" for immigrants, particularly those who do not have
authorized status.' To bolster the city's symbolic declaration, San
Francisco subsequently passed an ordinance that restricted city
employees from obtaining information about a person's immigration
status or revealing a person's known unauthorized immigration status to
the federal government.2 In so doing, San Francisco took the bold step of
aiming to assure undocumented immigrants that the city would serve as a
t Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., 1996,
Brown University; J.D., 2001, Stanford Law School.
T Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School. B.A., 1996,
University of Texas at Austin; J.D., 2000, American University Washington College of
Law; LL.M., Columbia Law School.
1. San Francisco Bd. of Supervisors Res. 1087-85 (1985), available at
http://www.sfcityattomey.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=486
(declaring San Francisco a "City of Refuge").
2. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (1989).
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
safe haven by not cooperating with federal immigration authorities, 3
whose responsibilities include removing unauthorized immigrants from
the United States.4
Two decades later, San Francisco continues to be a "sanctuary city."5
With notable exceptions, the city maintains its policy of not inquiring or
reporting undocumented immigrants to immigration officials.
Specifically, in 1992, the city exempted noncitizens who either have
committed felony crimes or have been detained for allegedly committing
felony crimes from the policy.6 A recent amendment to the ordinance,
passed by the Board of Supervisors over the mayor of San Francisco's
veto, provided that juvenile noncitizens would be treated separately from
adult criminal noncitizens.7 Under the current version, which became
effective in December 2009, juvenile noncitizens may be reported to
federal authorities only if they have been convicted of a felony.8
Many have criticized San Francisco's ordinance, both its current and
previous forms. Among these is former Congressman and U.S.
presidential candidate, Tom Tancredo. Vehemently opposed to San
Francisco's stance, Mr. Tancredo has argued that the city's
noncooperation law constitutes a "flagrant violation of federal law."9 In
particular, Mr. Tancredo was referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which
proscribes state and local governments from prohibiting their employees
from voluntarily reporting the immigration status of individuals, lawful
3. San Francisco joined a number of other municipalities that passed similar
sanctuary laws that were enacted in the mid-1980s. Cities passed these laws primarily to
address the plight of Central Americans whose asylum applications had been denied by
the federal government and were thus subject to removal. See Ignatius Bau, Cities of
Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local Government
Cooperation with INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 51-52 (1994).
4. Currently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) is charged with enforcing the Immigration And Nationality
Act (INA), including its removal procedures. See generally U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Detention and Removal, available at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/index.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
5. MAYOR OF SAN FRANCISCO, MAYOR'S 2009 ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX 210 (Sept.
30, 2009), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/mayor-index.asp?id=27047.
6. S.F. CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2-1 (2009).
7. S.F. CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (2009).
8. Note that while the ordinance was effective on December HI, 2009, the mayor and
city attorney have a sixty-day window to implement the policy. Mike Aldax, Legal Fight
Continues over Sanctuary Policy, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 11, 2009, available at
http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Legal-fight-continues-over-sanctuary-policy-
79029422.html.
9. The Associated Press, Killings Turn Focus on S.F. Sanctuary Law, July 24, 2008,
available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/2582738 I.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
or unlawful, to federal immigration officials.' 0 Indeed, San Francisco's
city attorney acknowledged in a legal memorandum that the Supervisors'
non-dissemination addendum "generally prohibits providing information
about immigration status to ICE,"" which implicates its validity under 8
U.S.C. § 1373.12
More broadly, the ordinance represents a growing trend in sub-
federal lawmaking with significant impact on immigrants, and
potentially, immigration.1 3 In passing the ordinance, both the mayor and
the Board of Supervisors operated with the presumption that the
provision of sanctuary to immigrants constituted a legitimate exercise of
local lawmaking. Yet, the validity of local and state laws-whether
intended to integrate and be more inclusive of non-citizens or designed to
exclude undocumented immigrants-is largely contested in both the
courts and legal scholarship.1 4 Concerns about the legality of sub-federal
laws generally center on the well-established principle that the federal
government has exclusive authority to regulate immigration law. 5
Accordingly, in addition to the concerns occasioned by contradictions
with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, the city's noncooperation policies specifically, and
sanctuary policies generally, must withstand federal plenary power
claims arguing that federal authority on matters of immigration and
immigrants excludes the possibility of state or municipal lawmaking that
relates to non-citizens.
This Article explores the doctrinal and theoretical challenges
confronting San Francisco's non-cooperation ordinance, and similar sub-
federal actions. It does so using a non-conventional but useful method of
engaging in a dialectic exchange. In using the dialectic structure, we take
our cue from Professor Stephen Legomsky's elegant use of the device in
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (West 2010):
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal,
State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way
restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
11. Memorandum from Deputy City Attorneys to Mayor Gavin Newsom 4 (Aug. 18,
2009), available at http://www.sfcityattorney.org/index.aspx?page=272 [hereinafter
Memorandum].
12. Id. The memo also notes, however, that "no one has challenged in court the
legality of San Francisco's City of Refuge Ordinance under Section 1373." Id.
13. See discussion infra Part III (explaining that the debate about sanctuary laws is
located within a larger conversation about the extent to which states and local
governments may participate in immigration regulation).
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
2009] 1685
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
his recent article on the meaning of undocumented status. 16 As he noted,
the format has been "under-utilized" in legal scholarly literature. 17 More
scholars should use this method, he contended, because it helps to reveal
the diametrically opposed positions of various groups concerning a
particular issue.18 Importantly, a dialectic conversation facilitates a more
constructive discussion of the issues at stake.
Convinced of the valuable contribution that a dialectic discourse
would bring to the debate about the validity of San Francisco's ordinance
and other similar sanctuary laws, we employ this method to draw out the
hotly contested perspectives galvanized by the controversial topic of sub-
federal immigration regulations. Through a fictional conversation
between "Professor Locke" and "Professor Shepherd,"' 19 we present the
opposing doctrinal views on whether San Francisco's ordinance is
preempted by 8 U.SC. § 1373.20 Agreeing that only one provision of the
ordinance potentially faces a preemptive strike, we articulate the
underlying doctrinal and theoretical issues facing sanctuary laws
specifically and sub-federal immigration regulation generally.
Ultimately, through the exchange, we develop how inclusionary
measures such as sanctuary laws may survive preemption analysis and
exclusionary measures such as bans on rental housing may be invalidated
on preemption grounds. In addition, apropos to the focus of this
symposium, we assess the impact of any potential comprehensive federal
immigration reform on such policies.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief discussion of
the history and current state of the sanctuary ordinance and other
immigrant-friendly aspects of San Francisco's policy. Part II engages in
a conversation about the constitutionality of sub-federal enactments like
the San Francisco ordinance. It highlights the motivations and purposes
of San Francisco's policy and the specific preemption challenges it faces.
Part III launches into a more general examination of the preemption
doctrine on sub-federal lawmaking related to undocumented immigrants.
In this part, we posit ways of doctrinally distinguishing inclusionary
16. Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44
GA. L. REv. 65 (2009).
17. Id. at 66.
18. Id. at 73-140. In his article, the dialectic exchange showed the general opposing
views about the ways in which undocumented immigrants should be treated. Id.
19. The authors were both fans of the television series "Lost."
20. We began this "conversation" in October on the N.Y. Times Bay Area blog. See
Gerry Shih, Legal Scholars Dissect S.F. Sanctuary Policy, N.Y. TIMES BAY AREA BLOG,
Oct. 21, 2009, available at http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/1 0/21/legal-scholars-
dissect-sf-sanctuary-policy/. The arguments presented here build on the earlier positions
we took on the N.Y. Times Bay Area blog.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
from exclusionary laws and policies. Part IV concludes with a discussion
of the implications of the arguments presented for comprehensive federal
immigration reform.
I. THE SAN FRANCISCO SANCTUARY ORDINANCE
The city's sanctuary ordinance is, in actuality, several related
policies.2' Conclusions as to the policy's constitutionality may be a
multi-part question that requires separate analysis of these constituent
parts. The law begins with a self-identifier provision without any
discernable legal consequence. It states, "[i]t is hereby affirmed that the
City and County of San Francisco is a City and County of Refuge."
22
Turning to the operative provisions, the ordinance bars expenditure of
city funds or resources to assist with immigration enforcement or
discovery of immigration status.23 In addition, the ordinance prohibits
local officials from detaining, arresting, or questioning an individual
solely because of immigration status.24
Finally, the law contains several information gathering and
disseminating provisions, which have become the subject of recent
political and legal scrutiny. First, the ordinance prohibits "gathering
information" about individuals' immigration status. 25 Second, subject to
important exceptions, it prohibits "disseminat[ing] information"
concerning individuals' immigration status.26 In its original form, the
ordinance applied to all noncitizens. The city subsequently narrowed the
ordinance in 1992 when it amended it to remove informational
protections for criminals and criminal suspects.27 Pursuant to the
amendments, the ordinance does not prohibit local officials and officers
from providing information to other government employees and entities
about (1) suspected violators of the Immigration and Nationality Act's
(INA) civil provisions who have been booked for alleged felony
commission, and (2) suspected violators of the INA's civil provisions
who are prior felony convicts currently in county jail. 28
21. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12H. 1-.6 (2009).
22. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.l.
23. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (stating that "[n]o department, agency,
commission, officer or employee of the City and County of San Francisco shall use any




27. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2- 1.
28. Id.
2009] 1687
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
In the middle of 2008, however, the sanctuary policy underwent a
change after a number of critical events. Chief of these was the tragic
killings of Anthony Bologna and two of his sons by an alleged
undocumented immigrant, Edwin Ramos. 29 Their deaths shocked the city
not only for the execution-style killing but also because they revealed an
unknown exception to the city's policy. Ramos had previously been
under the custody of city officials when he was a minor but he was not
turned over to federal authorities. 30 The non-disclosure of his status to
immigration officials exposed the city policy of not reporting the
immigration status of undocumented youths, including those who had
committed crimes, to the federal government.
31
Indeed, news reports uncovered that the city not only hid the
immigration information of undocumented youths from immigration
authorities but also placed them in group-housing, which enabled them to
walk away from custody. 32 The city had also repatriated some to their
home countries to help them avoid removal proceedings. 33 In light of
those revelations, Mayor Newsom pledged a "top-to-bottom" review of
the city's refuge policies. As part of that review, he changed the policy
and directed local police officers to also report alleged criminal juveniles
(under suspicion of violating the INA's civil provisions) to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers. 34 At least sixty-seven
undocumented immigrant minors were allegedly reported to the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and removed from the
U.S. since the mayoral policy change.35
29. Jaxon Van Derbeken, Edwin Ramos Won't Face Death Penalty, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 11, 2009, at D-I, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.-
cgi?f=-/c/a/2009/09/11 /BAM819L7NE.DTL.
30. It should be noted that there is a dispute regarding whether the city had in fact not
reported Edwin Ramos's immigration information to immigration officials. See Agencies
Play Blame Game in San Francisco's Illegal's Murder Case, Fox NEWS, July 23, 2008,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,389147,00.html (discussing how
federal immigration officials claimed they never received notice of Edwin Ramos
custody and suspected immigration status, but local officials claimed they disclosed
information to federal officials).
31. S.F. 's Sanctuary City Story So Far, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 31, 2008, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-08-3 1/news/1 7125186_ lsanctuary-city-immigration-law-
enforcement-juvenile.
32. Jaxon Van Derbeken, S.F.Fund Aids Teen Felons Who Are Illegals, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 3, 2008, at Al, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-08-03/news/-
17124569_ immigrant-felons-justice-grant-program.
33. Id.
34. See MAYOR'S 2009 ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX, supra note 5, at 210.
35. A report by the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department indicates that
between January 1, 2005 and April 3, 2009, a total of 252 youths suspected of being
undocumented had cases in the juvenile system. From January 2005 to July 2008, it
1688 [Vol. 55:1683
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
In November 2009, disagreeing with the mayor's executive change
that required disclosure of juveniles' immigration information to federal
officials upon detention, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted to
reinstitute the differentiated policy for juveniles.36 Although the
Supervisors version allowed reporting after a felony conviction, it
reverted to the prior policy of prohibiting reporting individuals to ICE
after arrest and charging, but before conviction.3 7 As he promised, Mayor
Newsom vetoed the policy, stating that "I believe in the sanctuary
ordinance and I wanted to promote it within the diverse communities that
are impacted, but we never promoted it, never believed it was a way to
shield criminal behavior."
38
The intra-municipal drama continued with the Supervisors overriding
the mayor's veto. Not to be outdone, Mayor Newsom directed city law
enforcement to ignore the ordinance, arguing that the city cannot act in
violation of federal law. 39 His decision had immediate effects, as through
January 2010, a few adolescent undocumented immigrants suspected of
criminal activity were reported to federal authorities and are currently in
removal proceedings.40
Meanwhile, since the override of the mayor's veto, the city attorney
of San Francisco has been corresponding with federal enforcement
officials, attempting to clarify the federal government's position on the
Supervisors' policy. In an initial exchange of letters between the city
attorney and the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of California, the
federal prosecutor explained that he considered compliance with the
City's new information-dissemination policies to be violations of federal
appears that up to 185 youths may have been shielded by the juvenile non-dissemination
policy. From July 2008, when the program was discovered and repealed, to April 2009,
sixty-seven youths were turned over to ICE officials. See Heather Knight, S.F. Sanctuary
Policy Shielded up to 185 Youths, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2009, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-03/news/171949601 _drug-charges-juvenile-
probation-system-youths. Notably, of those 252 youths, 180 were in custody for alleged
drug-related offenses. Id. Non-reporting of these youth could implicate state law
provisions as well. See Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(discussing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11369).
36. See Knight, supra note 35.
37. See id.
38. Richard Gonzales, San Francisco Youth Sanctuary Law Prompts Battle, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?-
storyld= 120061381&ft - I&f--1001.
39. Id.
40. Heather Knight, No Sanctuary for Boy after Charges Dropped, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
24, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi-?f=/c/a/-
2010/01/24/MNDI I BLR40.DTL.
2009] 1689
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
criminal and immigration laws.41 Subsequently, in March 2010, the city
attorney wrote to the deputy attorney general at the Department of
Justice (DOJ), requesting that the DOJ counsel the U.S. Attorney's
Office not to criminally prosecute city officials or employees who abide
by the City's new policy. 42 As discussed in greater detail infra, San
Francisco's sanctuary ordinance implicates 8 U.S.C. § 1373. It also raises
legal questions under other federal and state law. The U.S. attorney for
the Northern District of California, for instance, threatened that city
officials who complied with the city law may be federally prosecutable
for "harboring" youths who are unlawfully present for immigration law
purposes.43 In particular, the U.S. Attorney's Office is looking into
whether the transportation of undocumented youths and provision of
group homes to them constituted unlawful harboring under the anti-
harboring provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).44
On the state law end, the San Francisco Police Department, even
prior to the Ramos incident, unsuccessfully defended itself against legal
challenges under California law based on its non-communication with
federal authorities. In Fonseca v. Fong,45 San Francisco taxpayers
claimed that the police department was in violation of a state law that
required arresting officials to notify the appropriate federal authorities
when they had reason to believe that a drug-related arrestee was "not a
citizen" of the United States.46 Although plaintiff based his claim on a
conflict between city practice and state law, the police department
demurred on the basis that the state law mandating federal notification
47
constituted an unconstitutional immigration regulation. Forced to opine
on federal preemption issues, 48 the Fong court ruled that the state law,
just by requiring city officials to report certain drug-related arrestee's to
federal authorities, did not impermissibly invade federal power. It then
remanded the case for a determination on the merits of the alleged
conflict between city practice and state law.49
41. U.S. Attorney Joseph P. Russonieloo's response to City Attorney Dennis Herrera
regarding recent amendments to the San Francisco Sanctuary Ordinance, Dec. 3, 2009,
available at www.sfcityattorney.org/index.aspx?page=272.
42. Letter from City Attorney Herrera to Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, Mar. 12, 2010, available at www.sfcityattorney.org/index.aspx?page=272.
43. Heather Knight, Sanctuary Veto Overridden, Legal Action Possible, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 11, 2009, at C-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article-
.cgi?f=-/c/a/2009/l 1/1 I/BA04IA18CG.
44. Id. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (West 2010).
45. 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567.
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11369 (West 2010).
47. Id.
48. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 574-75.
49. Id. at 583-84.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
As the foregoing illustrated, what started off as a symbolic "City of
Refuge" statement has turned into an ordinance that lies at the center of
political and legal debates about the extent to which states and local
governments such as San Francisco may enact laws that affect the federal
government's exclusive authority over the regulation and enforcement of
immigration law.
50
II. SAN FRANCISCO'S ORDINANCE, 8 U.S.C. § 1373, AND PREEMPTION
ANALYSIS
Having provided the relevant background, the Article presents a
dialectic exchange about legal issues concerning San Francisco's
ordinance. In this Part, Professors Locke and Shepherd engage in a
conversation about whether San Francisco's ordinance is preempted by 8
U.S.C. § 1373. As we aim to make clear through their conversation, the
scope of the city's non-cooperation law has been the source of political
fights between the mayor and the Board of Supervisors, with both sides
seeking to engage the federal government to support their dichotomous
positions. Notwithstanding the political battle between these public
actors, the overall concern with this ordinance is whether or not it will
sustain a preemption challenge. The professors first highlight the
political issues surrounding the ordinance before addressing the specific
doctrinal issue of preemption.
50. As collateral damage caught in the increased scrutiny of the city's immigrant
policies in the wake of the Ramos incident and repatriation program revelations, the
city's Municipal ID program was also put on temporary hold after its passage in
November 2007. Modeled on a similar initiative in New Haven, Connecticut, the ID
program provides an identification card, regardless of immigration status, to bona fide
city residents who can then use the card to access city services and private enterprises
within the city who chose to accept the card for identification purposes. See Office of the
County Clerk, What is the SF City ID Card?, available at
http://www.sfgov2.org/index.aspx?page=1 10 (last visited June 11, 2010). After a brief
suspension, however, the program has been in effect now for over a year. After surviving
preemption challenges in state court in October 2008, and undergoing amendment in
November of that same year, the city began issuing resident cards in January 2009. Based
on initial reports, the card appears to be very popular among city residents. Heather
Knight, Hundreds Wait for Hours To Buy S.F. ID Card, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 16,
2009; see also Heather Knight, Sanctuary Veto Overridden, Legal Action Possible, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 11, 2009, at Cl, available at http://www.sfgate.com-
/cgibin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2009/1 1/ 11/-BAO41 AI8CG.DTL.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
A. Political Showdown
Locke: Both the San Francisco ordinance generally, and the recent
non-dissemination addendum specifically, exist despite the background
doctrinal proscription against sub-federal lawmaking affecting
immigrants. At base then, both Mayor Newsom and the Board of
Supervisors agree that the federal constitutional and political framework
allows the city of San Francisco to legislate integrationist policies-such
as its sanctuary policy-for undocumented persons within its borders.
Viewed in this light, the dispute between the Mayor and Supervisors
occurred within a small band of the political spectrum, where all parties
believe that the city can rightfully resist cooperation with federal
enforcement schemes.
Shepherd: To understand the ways in which the ordinance got caught
up in an intra-municipal political showdown, we should first address this
question: why did the Board of Supervisors want to enact a policy of
non-dissemination of undocumented juveniles' immigration status?
Locke: I think there are some fundamental concerns with juveniles
and the operation of our legal system that justify non-reporting of
criminal, undocumented juveniles prior to conviction. As you know,
determinations of undocumented presence are administrative decisions
that require a hearing in front of an immigration judge.5' So, in the first
instance, lay understandings of "illegal" must be approached with
caution; the consequences of an unlawful presence determination are
significant for these individuals.
Shepherd: That is true but it seems to me that the justification for
treating undocumented juveniles would similarly apply to adults. That is,
having the determination of one's unlawful presence in the country or
guilt with respect to a particular crime decided through the proper
regulatory procedures is equally important to unauthorized adults. Yet
the city chose not to provide protections for such adults.
Locke: The city opted to treat children differently from adults, a
group whose culpability for their own unlawful presence is highly
dubious. As the Supreme Court's opinion in Plyler v. Doe rightly noted,
it is often not a juvenile's choice to cross a national border without
inspection.52 Perhaps the point that most intuitively resonates with our
society's sense of fairness is that our criminal system is based on the
fundamental notion that one is not guilty until proven so. The city's
policy doesn't ban all reporting of the immigration status of suspected
51. See 8 U.S.C. § 12299(a) (West 2010).
52. 457 U.S. 202, 245 (1982).
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SANCTUARYPOLICIES
undocumented youth in the criminal system; it only requires that city
officials hold-off on any such reporting of immigration status until that
youth is adjudged as a criminal, after an opportunity to present a
defense.
53
Shepherd: Perhaps you are correct that the difference between the
treatment of immigration information of undocumented adults and
juveniles is that the city is addressing the needs of children. By not
reporting those juveniles who have not been proven guilty of the crimes
for which they were arrested, the city facilitates keeping the juveniles'
ties to their families and the communities. I recognize these humanitarian
concerns that convinced the Board of Supervisors to amend the
ordinance. Yet, the Mayor has taken the position that children must be
treated in the same way as adults.
Locke: Yes, the recent addendum underwent a political battle
between Mayor Newsom and the Board of Supervisors.54 One of the
reasons Mayor Newsom proffered for his version of the policy is his
belief that pushing the boundaries of legality with the new version will
jeopardize the remainder of the policy. 55 He stated that he is still a strong
proponent of the general sanctuary policy, and doesn't want to endanger
the general provisions by inviting litigation on the specific juvenile
aspects.56 I believe the Mayor has overstated the risk of the policy as a
whole being in danger. The general ordinance has now been in existence
for over two decades, and several other jurisdictions have similar
noncooperation laws.
57
Shepherd: I do think that there is merit to the Mayor's argument that
the Board of Supervisors' recent change to the ordinance has made it
vulnerable to a potential federal preemption challenge that could affect
the ordinance as a whole. 58 For over twenty years, San Francisco's
sanctuary ordinance co-existed with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 with very little
resistance from the federal government despite the ordinance's apparent
53. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2-1 (2009).
53. Richard Gonzales, San Francisco Youth Sanctuary Law Prompts Battle, NAT'L
PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story-
/story.php?storyld= 120061381.
55. See MAYOR'S 2009 ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX, supra note 5, at 210; see also,
Gonzales, supra note 53 (quoting Mayor Newsom: "I believe in the sanctuary ordinance
and I wanted to promote it within the diverse communities that are impacted but we never
promoted it, never believed it was a way to shield criminal behavior.").
56. Id.
57. See generally Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a Sanctuary?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133
(2008); see also Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1373, 1382-84 (2006).
58. See Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
inconsistency with the federal law. That is, in principle, the ordinance's
purpose of providing a safe haven for unauthorized noncitizens (mainly
to those who have not committed crimes) by not reporting them to
federal officials collides with the federal government's responsibility of
determining whether those persons are removable and, if they are, then
eventually deporting them after the appropriate removal process. 59 To
date, the federal government had chosen to overlook this ostensible
conflict between the local and federal laws.
60
Yet, the federal inaction could change as a result of the significant
attention that has been raised about the new ordinance provision
regarding the non-reporting of unauthorized juveniles who have not been
convicted of a felony crime.
Not only San Francisco's policy is at stake; so are the other
sanctuary policies in other cities. 61 The federal government may have not
addressed them before but under today's heightened immigration
enforcement trends, the possibility that federal officials will step in to
seek to invalidate such policies is greater. 62 Arguably, the mayor's 2008
change to the policy (that the current amendment overturned) was a just-
in-time save that may have delayed federal intervention.
Locke: I view the lack of federal action to counter sanctuary policies
as lack of power and political desire to do so, rather than a choice by
federal authorities to leave those policies alone. Although never
explicitly articulated, the federal government's legal inaction likely
stems from recognizing the limits of federal authority, and understanding
the scope of local discretion. Legislatively, in the last few years, although
the general issue of sanctuary cities has generated debate and controversy
in Congress, a recent Congressional attempt to punish sanctuary
jurisdictions failed to pass the Senate.63 In fact, to the contrary, there was
even a draft proposal introduced this past year that would have repealed
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (West 2010) (removal proceedings).
60. See Villazor, supra note 56; see Pham, supra note 56.
61. See NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES
INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy-
/LocalLaw/locallaw-limiting-tbl-2008-12-03.pdf (providing a list of over 70 jurisdictions
that have adopted sanctuary laws and policies).
62. See John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Rise in U.S. Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009, at A-16 (reporting the rise in federal immigration enforcement in
2009).
63. The "Vitter Amendment" to the 2007 Appropriations Bill, drafted by David Vitter
(R-La.) would have withheld federal law enforcement funds from jurisdictions that
continued their sanctuary policies. The measure passed the House 234-189, but was voted
down 52-42 in the Senate. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.), a former mayor of San
Franscisco, voted against the Vitter Amendment.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
§ 1373 altogether. 64 Realistically, there simply isn't enough political will
to expressly override these policies, or to prosecute the city officials of
the several dozens of cities across the country that have sanctuary-type
ordinances.
Shepherd: Perhaps there might not be political will at the
congressional level but there seems to be ample support at the local level
to undermine the San Francisco ordinance. As noted earlier, the U.S.
attorney began investigating the ordinance's potential violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) 65 for transporting undocumented youths and
placing some of them in group homes. Although this provision has yet to
be extended to situations such as what occurred in San Francisco, a court
might be convinced to interpret the statute in this way.
Locke: I think it's important to note here that only the transportation
of youth under the juvenile court system's "unofficial" policy of
repatriation or half-way housing fits neatly into the U.S. attorney's
interpretation of federal law. In that situation, the city's juvenile court
system, with the aid of city officials and public funds, was not only
keeping information about convicted juvenile offenders from federal
officials, but was also secreting them out of the country or into situations
wherein the juveniles could avoid federal criminal and immigration
66prosecution.
As applied to the recent non-disclosure policy adopted by the
Supervisors, however, I think the U.S. attorney's response was likely
bluster, intended to intimidate the City into changing its policies through
threat of federal action. First, the U.S. attorney's current investigation
into San Francisco's policies was occasioned by, and relates to, the city's
prior practice of repatriating immigrant juvenile offenders; the juvenile
non-dissemination policy is not thus far the subject of the federal grand
jury investigation.67 Second, although U.S. attorneys have broad
discretion, they cannot independently dictate federal prosecution
priorities. In other words, he could not have publically stated that he
would refrain from prosecuting city officials even if they potentially
violated the INA by following the city ordinance.68 He is compelled to
investigate violations of federal law unless a directive from the attorney
general or the president provides otherwise. 69 Third, and importantly, he
64. See H.R. 264, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3.
68. See Letter from City Attorney Herrera to Deputy Attorney General, supra note 41.
69. Cf Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General of the United States to Selected
United States Attorneys Re: Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the
Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://blogs.usdoj.gov-
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
weighed in on the San Francisco policy in response to a query by the San
Francisco city attorney, who was seeking assurance of non-prosecution
of city officials for complying with the juvenile "don't tell" policy.70 The
city attorney is compelled to provide the city and its officials with legal
information about even remote liability. Finally, knowing that the U.S.
attorney's response would suggest robust federal enforcement, Mayor
Newsom's accountability for refusing to enforce the Supervisors' policy
is lessened. In a year when the mayor is considering seeking statewide
office, he likely did not want to assume the political heat of an
immigrant-shielding policy, even if those policies are supported by a
majority of other elected city officials. Furthermore, a city official
waiting until conviction to disseminate information about the suspected
immigration status of a juvenile was, in all likelihood, not what the
"harboring" crimes section of the INA was meant to deter, and I think it
is an open question whether a federal court would interpret the INA to
cover that situation. In any case, his response to the city attorney's query
didn't deter the Board of Supervisors and the notoriety has created some
political heat, with some in the jurisdiction calling for Senators Feinstein
and Boxer to push to replace him.71
Shepherd: The city attorney's March 2010 letter to the U.S.
Department of Justice requesting non-prosecution of city employees who
choose to follow the law by not reporting undocumented juvenile to
federal officials, however, suggests that the mayor wants to enforce the
ordinance. It appears that he and the city attorney simply want to be
assured that their local enforcement officers do not become subject to
prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office.
/blog/archives/192 ("As a general matter, pursuit of [illegal drug enforcement] priorities
should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of
marijuana.").
70. See Letter from San Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera to United States
Attorney Joseph P. Russoniello (Nov. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.sfcityattorney.org-/index.aspx?page=272 ("I ask that the U.S. Attorney's
Office provide an assurance that if the City proceeds to implement this Amendment in
accordance with its terms, City law enforcement officers and employees will not be
prosecuted for violating federal criminal laws."); Letter from U.S. Attorney Russoniello
to S.F. City Attorney Dennis Herrera (Dec. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.sfcityattorney.org/index.aspx?page=272 ("In specific response to the question
you posed in your letter, it probably will come as no surprise to you that I have no
authority, discretionary or otherwise, to grant amnesty from federal prosecution to
anyone who follows the protocol set out in the referenced ordinance.").
71. See S.F. Board of Supervisors Res. No. 78-09, 2009 Reg. Meeting (Cal. Mar. 17,
2009), available at www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions09/r0078-
09.pdf (urging President Barack Obama and Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne
Feinstein to appoint a new U.S. attorney for the Northern District of California).
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
Locke: I don't think he has a choice. The Board had passed the law
and ultimately he has the obligation to enforce it.
B. Preemption Analysis: Doctrinal Framework
Shepherd: That takes us to the inescapable question of whether San
Francisco's ordinance is preempted either by 8 U.S.C. § 1373
specifically, the INA generally, or by federal exclusivity in the
immigration field. But in order for us to engage in this discussion, we
should first determine the doctrinal framework courts would employ to
evaluate the preemption questions. Next, we would need to examine 8
U.S.C. § 1373's precise scope to more fully analyze whether or not it
expressly preempts San Francisco's policy.
Locke: I agree. Determining the doctrinal paradigm is not only
important but timely. Within the last few years, federal courts have
considered a number of challenges to state and local laws that have been
challenged on the grounds that they are preempted under the federal
government's exclusive province over immigration regulation. 72 A brief
review of some of the recent cases demonstrates that courts examined
them under related but slightly different preemption frameworks,73
making it uncertain what precise analytical test would be applied in
examining San Francisco's sanctuary ordinance. One set of cases applied
72. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir.
2010) (reviewing preemption challenge to the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act, which imposed sanctions to employers for hiring undocumented workers, which is a
prohibited act under Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)); Chicanos Por La
Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2010) (No. 09-115)
(reviewing preemption challenge to the Arizona Legal Workers Act because the law led
to an employer's loss of a business license for hiring unauthorized workers); Villas at
Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 303-CV-1615, slip op. 2010 WL 1141398 (N.D.
Tex) (March 24, 2010) (reviewing preemption challenge to Ordinance 2952 enacted by
the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, which denied undocumented immigrants the ability to
enter into a residential lease); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577
F. Supp. 2d 858, 865-76 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (reviewing preemption challenge to Ordinance
2903 enacted by the city of Farmers Branch, Texas, which barred undocumented
immigrants from renting housing); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517-
33 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (preemption challenge to the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania's Illegal
Immigrant Relief Act, which barred employers from hiring undocumented immigrants
and prohibited landlords from renting housing to undocumented immigrants).
73. Compare Villas at Parkside, 2010 WL 1141398 at *13 (using three-part analysis
set forth in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), which asks whether a state or local
law is attempting to regulate immigration law, is regulating a field occupied by Congress
or conflicts with federal law) with Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 517-33 (using both express
preemption analysis and implied preemption analysis, which asks whether Congress
occupied the field or whether the state or local law conflicts with federal law).
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
an express and implied preemption analysis focused in large part on
whether a federal law included a specific "preemption" clause.74 Another
group of cases utilized the test for preemption established under De
Canas v. Bica,75 which is unique to immigration issues.
Under the traditional preemption analysis, courts generally consider
whether a federal law expressly precludes state and local governments
from passing such a law. The strongest evidence of Congress's intent to
preempt sub-federal law-making is a provision, section or clause within a
federal law that explicitly preempts other federal, state or local laws. For
instance, recent challenges to laws in Arizona and Oklahoma that
prohibited employers from hiring undocumented workers have focused
on whether these laws fell within the exception recognized in the
Immigration Reform and Control Act's (IRCA) preemption clause.76
Moreover, some courts, even after conducting express preemption, have
chosen to undertake implied preemption analyses as well. That is, even
where courts have found that a law is expressly preempted, they have
chosen to analyze whether the state or local law conflicts with the federal
law or whether the law is occupying a field that falls within Congress's
domain.
77
A related but slightly different analysis was established in De Canas.
In that case, the Supreme Court employed a three-part test for
determining whether a state or local law is preempted.78 First, a court
would analyze whether the law is attempting to regulate immigration
law.79 Second, even if the law does not constitute an impermissible
74. Chamber of Commerce, 594 F.3d at 765 (appling express and implied preemption
analysis to determine whether the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act was
preempted under IRCA); Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863 (utilized express and
implied preemption analysis to examine whether the Arizona Legal Workers Act was
preempted under IRCA); Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518-21 (employing express and
implied preemption analysis to examine whether the employment provision of Hazleton's
Illegal Immigrant Relief Act was expressly preempted under federal law).
75. De Canas, 424 U.S. 351. See Villas at Parkside, 2010 WL 1141398 at *13
(employing the De Canas framework to analyze whether Farmers Branch Ordinance
2952 was preempted); Villas at Parkside Partners, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (utilizing the
De Canas three-part test to determine whether Farmers Branch Ordinance 2903 was
preempted).
76. See, e.g., Chamber, 594 F.3d at 765; Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863. 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) provides that the "provisions of this section preempt any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens."
77. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce, 594 F.3d at 765; Chicanos Por La Causa, 558
F.3d at 863; Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518-21.
78. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-62.
79. Id. at 354.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
immigration regulation, it might otherwise still be regarded as preempted
by implication if it regulates a field occupied by Congress. 80 Third, a
state or local law is preempted if it conflicts with federal law. 81 The first
two parts of the De Canas test are unique to immigration law or have had
different application in the immigration field. Because of the oft-
repeated, but very general, proposition that "[p]ower to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,"82 the first
part of the test can invalidate some state regulation even in the absence
of federal legislative or executive action. The second part of the test is
not unique to the immigration field, but because aspects of immigration
are considered exclusively federal, field preemption appears to operate
more expansively in immigration law than it does in other legislative
areas, such as criminal law, where co-regulation between federal and
state authorities has long-been acknowledged. The last test of the
tripartite analysis is uncontroversial and not unique to the immigration
field. As per the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, 83 any properly
enacted federal law overrides a conflicting state law, both within and
outside of the immigration context.
84
Thus, in this case, assuming the city of San Francisco is sued on
preemption grounds, the question that emerges is whether 8 U.S.C. §
1373 expressly preempts the ordinance or, even if no such express
preemption had occurred, whether the ordinance is nevertheless
preempted by implication because it either intrudes or conflicts with the
exclusive federal power over immigration.
Shepherd: Before we analyze the ordinance, however, it is necessary
to clarify precisely the scope of what 8 U.S.C. § 1373 prohibits in order
to analyze whether or not San Francisco's ordinance as a whole or its
particular provisions contravene federal law. From a broad perspective,
the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 deals with "[c]ommunication between
[g]overnment agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service., 85 The plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) proscribes federal,
state and local entities and officials from doing at least two general acts.
First, it prohibits them from preventing "any entity or official" from
sending information about a person's immigration status to the
"Immigration and Naturalization Service," which would now be ICE. 86
80. Id. at 357.
81. Id. at 361.
82. Id. at 354.
83. See U.S. CoNsT., art. VI, cl. 2.
84. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 82 (1824) (stating that the Supremacy Clause
strikes down any state or local law that "interfere[s] with or [is] contrary to" federal law).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (West 2010).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
Second, it proscribes any government entity or official from prohibiting
another "entity or official" from receiving information about an
individual's immigration information from ICE.87 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b)
bans any "person or agency" from prohibiting any federal, state or local
government entity from sending or receiving specific immigration
information to or from ICE.88
It also adds two additional proscriptions: the section prohibits any
person or agency from preventing federal, state or local government
entities from maintaining information or exchanging information with
89
other governmental entities. Summed up in simpler terms, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373 prohibits government entities, agencies, officials and persons
from preventing the voluntary reporting of a person's immigration status
by any governmental entity, officials or employees to federal
immigration authority.
90
Locke: That is correct. Let us then examine each of the constituent
parts of the San Francisco sanctuary ordinance to assess whether it is
expressly preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or if it is preempted by
implication. At the outset, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 does not contain a provision
that expressly preempts any federal, state or local law.9' Unlike the
IRCA,92 which, as courts have noted, contains an explicit preemption
provision, 93 8 U.S.C. § 1373 fails to include such an express provision.
Shepherd: That is true although there is reason to believe that the
express preemption analysis would not end there. Both subsections (a)
and (b) of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 include the relevant language,
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law." 94
Although the language is distinguishable from IRCA's express
preemption provision that that has been at issue in the Arizona and
Oklahoma laws, as Professor Huyen Pham argued previously, these
clauses arguably demonstrate Congress's intent to expressly preempt
similar sub-federal laws.95
Locke: That leads us then to an analysis of the more specific
provisions of the ordinance. It is clear to me that the declaration of San
Francisco as a "City of Refuge" is not expressly preempted by 8 U.S.C.
87. Id.
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b).
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(2), (3).
90. See Pham, supra note 56.
91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
92. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
93. Chamber of Commerce, 594 F.3d at 765; Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at
863 (explaining that IRCA contains an explicit preemption provision).
94. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a); see 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b).
95. See Pham, supra note 56, at 1391-92.
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SANCTUARYPOLICIES
§ 1373. Nor does this provision suffer from conflict and field preemption
concerns. Indeed, in my view, this provision lacks any operative, legal
force. Any city should be free to identify itself and stake-out symbolic
positions.
Shepherd: I agree that the general statement about being a "City of
Refuge" is neither expressly preempted nor preempted by implication.
As a practical matter, however, I wonder if the declaration even
accomplishes anything or actually has the impact the city believes it will
have. Do immigrants, especially undocumented ones, distinguish
between local, state, and federal authorities such that they would be
aware of and take advantage of a sanctuary city?9
6
Locke: The empirical question you pose is an important one. When
Mayor Newsom changed the policy to allow immigrant juveniles to be
reported, many immigrants and immigrant-rights advocates protested
against him.97 That suggests to me that immigrants do recognize the
significance of the sanctuary policy. 98 Although I wish I could prove that
identifying provisions such as San Francisco's have real practical effects,
I cannot. Mayor Newsom, along with the Board of Supervisors, did fund
and implement a significant awareness campaign with public money to
inform undocumented persons and their families about the city's
policies.99 I can only assume that the publicity campaign had some effect.
Perhaps more importantly then, I am convinced that section 12H.2,
restricting the use of city funds to enforce immigration law, is similarly
consistent with federal law. If the irreducible sovereignty of states the
Supreme Court discussed in federalism jurisprudence means anything,'00
it must at least mean that states, and sub-divisions thereof, can decide
how to distribute their revenues for the betterment of those within their
96. See Orde Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the
Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449 (2006).
97. See Marisa Lagos, Mission District Rally for Immigrant Rights, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
26, 2009, at B3, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/200 9-02-26/bay-
area/ 17188791 1 immigration-raids-immigrant-families-jordan-school; See also Marisa
Lagos & John Cot6, New Sanctuary Proposal on Protecting Youths, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
18, 2009, at Al, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-08-18/news/-
17177061 1 _immigration-sanctuary-felony.
98. See Marisa Lagos, Protesting City's Treatment of Immigrants, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
26, 2009, at B3; See also Marisa Lagos & John Cote, New Effort to Shield Youths, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 18, 2009, at A 1.
99. MAYOR OF SAN FRANSISCO, supra note 5, at 210 (detailing the public awareness
campaign to inform residents of San Francisco's refuge status).
100. See. e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius
of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one
federal, each protected from incursion by the other.").
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
jurisdictions. Dictating the way in which states and localities must use
their resources or prioritize their law-enforcement functions turns them
into arms of the federal government, in a manner frowned upon by the
Supreme Court.10' Because forcing sub-federal governments to expend
resources to apprehend federal law violators is not a trivial or ministerial
task, I can't imagine the "no funds or resources" provisions being
invalidated.
Shepherd: I agree that nothing in 8 U.S.C. § 1373 may be viewed to
expressly preempt the ordinance's proscription of the use of its local
revenues to assist the federal government in enforcing the civil
provisions of immigration law. I also do no think that this provision is
preempted by implication because I view the prohibition of local funds
for enforcement purposes to be different from 8 U.S.C. § 1373's broad
purpose of enhancing communication between the federal and state and
local governments and 8 U.S.C. § 1373's specific proscription against
barring employees from voluntarily reporting known unauthorized
immigration status to federal immigration authorities.
0 2
The provisions of the city's ordinance that raise both express and
implied preemption concerns deal with the proscriptions against
"gathering" or "receiving information" and "disseminating information"
regarding the immigration status of any individual.
To begin, the "no gathering" portion of San Francisco's ordinance is
arguably expressly preempted by federal law. As explained previously, 8
U.S.C. § 1373 explicitly prohibits the act of preventing a government
entity, official, agency or person from "receiving" information from ICE.
San Francisco's ordinance does prohibit the receipt of information and is
thus prohibited by the express language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
Locke: I disagree. There is a difference between the act of
"gathering" or affirmatively obtaining information from the more passive
act of "receiving." The "no gathering" provision of San Francisco's
ordinance proscribes city employees from acquiring information through
some kind of an affirmative inquiry about her immigration status. It is
what has been referred to as a "don't ask" provision. By contrast, the
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 suggests that Congress sought to bar the
proscription against the more passive conduct of simply receiving
101. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down provisions of the
federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which required local law enforcement
officers to conduct background checks and other related tasks on prospective gun
buyers); See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down "take
title" provisions of the Federal Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985 which
required states to assume liability for waste generated within their borders and regulate
according to Congress' instructions).
102. See Pham, supra note 56, at 1393-94.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
information. Additionally, the text of the statute explains from whom the
receipt of information should not be prohibited: federal officials. That is,
8 U.S.C. § 1373 bars state and local governments from prohibiting the
receipt of informationfrom federal officials about a persons immigration
status. There is no express conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
Indeed, Congress, in passing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, opted not to require
state and local governments to ask for an individual's immigration status
or mandate them to report such status to immigration officials. Congress
was well aware of the sanctuary movement when it passed this law yet it
chose not to mandate the gathering or reporting of information.10 3 Thus,
even if San Francisco's ordinance provided that city officials may not
"ask" or "inquire" about a person's immigration status, it would still not
be expressly preempted. Importantly, Congress cannot constitutionally
command state and local government entities, officials and employees to
do so.
0 4
Congress may of course attempt to enact spending provisions, which
could practically compel sub-federal reporting by making non-
cooperation too financially detrimental, 0 5 but it has thus far not
successfully passed any such legislation.
Shepherd: In my view, under a statutory construction of the plain
language of the law, 8 U.S.C. § 1373's prohibition against proscribing
"receiving" information would encompass the "no gathering" provision
of the law. Even if there is no express preemption violation, there is the
strong argument to be made that the law is preempted by implication
because prohibiting employees from "not asking" about a person's
immigration status would conflict with the 8 U.S.C. § 1373's purpose of
promoting communication between federal and state and local
governments.
In similar textual fashion, San Francisco's provision requiring non-
dissemination of immigration information of juveniles who are arrested
for felony crimes is also expressly preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1373. There
is no escaping the fact that failing to report such information to federal
officials directly contravenes what 8 U.S.C. § 1373 proscribes:
prohibiting state and local governments from quashing voluntarily
reporting of potential immigration violations to federal immigration
103. See Pham, supra note 56, at 1393-94 (explaining that Congress had intended to
preempt sanctuary laws when it passed laws in 1996 that were subsequently codified in 8
U.S.C. § 1373).
104. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (holding that the federal government may not compel
states and local governments to enforce a federal program).
105. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding federal scheme
for highway fund allocations depending on enactment of state laws regulating drinking
age).
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
authorities. This "don't tell" portion of the San Francisco ordinance is
essentially akin to the executive order struck down by the Second Circuit
in City of New York v. United States. 106 If you recall, that executive order
prohibited New York City employees from voluntarily reporting
immigration information to federal officials. 10 7 In ruling against the city's
Tenth Amendment claim, the court held that the city did not have the
"untrammeled right to forbid all voluntary cooperation by state or local
officials with particular federal programs."' 0 8 It is difficult to determine
how San Francisco's non-dissemination policy can be distinguished from
the ones at issue in New York.
Locke: I concede that the "don't tell" provisions are problematic.
Here, the issue as you point out is one of explicit discord with 8 U.S.C. §
1373, which potentially bars the very prohibition the city purports to
institute. One potential factor distinguishing San Francisco's "don't tell"
policy from the one held preempted in New York is the fact that the San
Francisco provisions only require non-dissemination for arrested
juveniles prior to a conviction. 0 9 This may change the calculus. In New
York, the court noted that the city failed to establish how its general
policy of non-disclosure of immigration information of non-citizens only
to the federal government (and not other city employees) could survive
federalism principles. In the case of San Francisco's ordinance, the
sanctuary law's specific provision with respect to non-disclosure of
undocumented juveniles' immigration status to federal officials is
consistent with restrictions on the release of various information
concerning juveniles to other public officials. California state law, for
instance, limits the dissemination of information about those under the
age of majority in criminal proceedings." 0 Additionally, federal
immigration law itself treats noncitizens under the age of majority
differently from adults, manifesting Congressional desire to variegated
rules based on age."' On this point, even the New York court recognized
that its preemption of the city's non-dissemination policy was subject to
106. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
107. Id. at 30.
108. Id. at 35.
109. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2-1 (2009).
110. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 827-828 (requiring that juvenile court records
be kept confidential but authorizing several categories of officials to inspect the
juvenile's file); see also Memorandum, supra note 11.
111. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(2)(A)() (West 2010) (exception to criminal
inadmissibility grounds for crimes committed by aliens under 18 years of age); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(A) (West 2010) (deportability provision incorporating inadmissibility
grounds).
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SANCTUARYPOLICIES
exceptions.1 12 As the Second Circuit noted, the city of New York facially
challenged the federal law, which did not provide the court with an
opportunity to determine if specific applications-for example, to
juveniles-may withstand preemption. 1 3  If we understand San
Francisco's non-dissemination of information regarding the suspected
immigration status of juveniles to be part of a general state and local
scheme to preserve confidentiality in non-adult criminal proceedings, the
San Francisco Supervisors' policy does not run afoul of New York.
Shepherd: The exceptions outlined by the Second Circuit, however,
were fairly narrow in scope. In a case involving San Francisco's
ordinance, the city would have to present evidence of how its
undocumented juvenile non-reporting policy is "integral to the operation
of city government."' 4 Even the San Francisco city attorney
acknowledged the difficulty of saving the new ordinance under that
exception. 1 5
Locke: I think that on this point, the currently pending case regarding
the viability of Arizona's Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA)" 6 is of
potential significance. That case, dealing with state law that imposes
penalties on businesses that hire undocumented workers, is currently on
the Court's docket, awaiting argument and a decision.17 The Ninth
Circuit opinion held LAWA non-preempted by federal laws that also
impose penalties on state law, and preempt sub-federal regulation."
8
However, the Ninth Circuit was willing to find that Arizona's enactment
fit into a narrow exception to the federal law.1 9 So too, here, it is
possible that a court would be willing to read the exceptions read into §
112. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 36 ("The obtaining of pertinent information, which
is essential to the performance of a wide variety of state and local governmental
functions, may in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of
confidentiality is not preserved. Preserving confidentiality may in turn require that state
and local governments regulate the use of such information by their employees.").
113. Id. at35.
114. Id. at 37. The city of New York was unable to meet this test when it defended its
policy. Id.
115. Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4-5.
116. See Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863 (holding that the Legal Arizona
Workers Act was not expressly preempted by IRCA because the law fell within the
licensing exception to IRCA).
117. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498.
118. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)
(West 1986) ("The provisions of this section preempt any State or Local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing or similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.").
119. Chicanos PorLa Causa, 558 F.3d at 864.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
1373 by New York to save San Francisco's recently enacted non-
dissemination policy.
Shepherd: The Tenth Circuit, however, reached the opposite
conclusion in a recent case.120 There, the court held that an Oklahoma
state law that subjected employers to various penalties for employing an
unauthorized noncitizen imposed "sanctions" on employers in violation
of IRCA's express terms.1 2' This textualist reading of the statute that led
to a preemptive strike of the state law supports a similar preemption
approach to San Francisco's ordinance.
Moreover, I'm skeptical of the analogy between the business penalty
laws that implicate IRCA's express preemption provision and "don't
tell" policies such as San Francisco's. However, I do agree with the
general point that Supreme Court adjudication of LAWA in the coming
term will substantially impact preemption analysis in federal courts.
In any case, up until now, no one has brought a direct challenge to
the city's ordinance in its current form. If such a lawsuit is brought, the
city would have to brace itself for an uphill legal battle that could have
an impact on the other cities that have similar policies. The U.S.
Attorney Russinello's threatened federal prosecution of city officials
adhering to the Supervisors' policy may bring about this issue, although
given the Mayor's non-enforcement of the policy, it is not clear that the
U.S. Attorney will have any one to prosecute in the near future.
Locke: In sum, we disagree on two points regarding whether 8
U.S.C. § 1373 expressly preempts San Francisco's sanctuary ordinance.
You contend that the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 preempts both San
Francisco's proscription against the receiving of immigration status
information as well as the dissemination of such information. I, on the
other hand, argue that neither one is preempted because San Francisco's
law prevents gathering or inquiring individuals about their immigration
status, which in my view is not expressly prohibited by 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
Additionally, San Francisco's non-reporting provision is covered by the
exceptions noted in New York and will thus not be struck down on
preemption grounds.
120. Chamber of Commerce, 594 F.3d at 765.
121. Id.
[Vol. 55:16831706
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
III. SUB-FEDERAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION AND PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE
A. Local Matters Versus Local Immigration Regulation
Shepherd: Thus far, we've only focused on the preemption issues
between a specific federal provision and the city's policies. But, there are
broader concerns with San Francisco's-and any other city's-sanctuary
ordinances. In particular, San Francisco's ordinance is part of the
increasing number of sub-federal laws that either intend to control
immigration law or have the effect of regulating immigration law. Aren't
you concerned about the eventual creation of what other commentators
have called the "patchwork" of immigration regulation and enforcement
across the country? The Supreme Court has long recognized the need to
have uniformity in immigration regulation, which can best be
accomplished by maintaining the federal government's exclusive control
over immigration matters. 122 Sanctuary ordinances like San Francisco's
inject variation and incongruity into the field.
Locke: Generally, I think the "patchwork" argument proves too
much. Plenty of legislative areas vary between localities and states.
Enforcement officials, private businesses, and individuals have been able
to navigate that variegation in areas such as criminal law, taxation,
environmental standards, and family law. Undoubtedly it causes
inefficiencies, but our Constitution doesn't compel wise or efficient
public policy.
Shepherd: It doesn't, but with regard to immigration regulation and
enforcement, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the federal
government must have control over immigration law. As the Supreme
Court explained in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,123 states
and local governments "can neither add to nor take from the conditions
lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and
residence of aliens in the United States."
' 124
Yet, states and local governments today continue to encroach on this
well-established principle by passing laws that attempt to regulate
immigration and, as a result, facilitate the fragmentation of immigration
regulation. On one side of the spectrum are laws that are intended to
exclude undocumented immigrants from a state or local domain. The
most recent example of this is Arizona's law, SB 1070, that allows local
police officers to identify and detain persons who they reasonably
122. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581.
123. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
124. See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
suspect to be present in the United States unlawfully or without
authorized immigration status. 125 Another law, also from Arizona, further
underscores the trend in subfederal immigration regulation. LAWA,
which was passed in 2007, punished employers who knowingly hired
unauthorized workers by revoking their business licenses. 126 In so doing,
Arizona imposed a higher penalty than the federal IRCA compels on
employers who employ undocumented immigrants.127 Impressing greater
penalties than are required under IRCA would undercut IRCA's goal of
having a uniform and consistent set of laws governing the unlawful
hiring of unauthorized workers. 28 Still another example is a local
ordinance passed in the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, that restricts
undocumented noncitizens from renting residential property.
129
On the other side of the spectrum are laws that are deemed to be
more inclusive of noncitizens, regardless of their immigration status. San
Francisco's sanctuary ordinance clearly falls under this category. So does
San Francisco's prior policy of repatriating noncitizen minors to their
home countries.' 30 The city had the understandably humanitarian concern
of ensuring that the noncitizen minors would not be harshly treated by
federal authorities and permanently barred from return to the country.
Yet, allowing local municipalities to engage in such conduct could open
the door to inconsistent removal actions. Critically, determining who
should be removed from the United States is a core function of the
federal government.
Locke: Your examples actually persuade me that non-uniformity is
non-problematic. They are fundamentally different situations that require
different analysis.
125. United States v. Arizona, No. 10-1413, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 2926157 (D. Ariz.
Jul. 28, 2010) (temporarily enjoining key provisions of Arizona's law); Arizona Sen. Bill
1070, available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/491eg/2r-/bills/sbI070h.pdf; see also
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, at AI,
Apr. 23, 2010.
126. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-211 to 23-216 (2007).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (West 2010).
128. See Peter Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 57, 88-89 (explaining that Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341
(2001) may be used to argue that the creation of additional sanctions may be deemed to
undermine federal regulatory goals of IRCA).
129. FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., ORDINANCE 2952 (2008), available at
http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/sites/default/files/Ordinance%20No%202952.pdf
(requiring proof of lawful immigration status prior to entering a residential lease).
130. See Heather Knight, S.F. Sanctuary Policy Shielded Up to 185 Youths, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 3, 2009, at Al, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-
03/news/I 7194960_1_drug-charges-juvenile-probation-system-youths.
1708 (Vol. 55:1683
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
I agree with you that the city's prior program of repatriating
undocumented felonious juveniles is unconstitutional because it invades
federal exclusivity over border regulation. Although I support the city's
reasoning for maintaining the program, the act of physically removing
the individuals and avoiding federal procedures is naked control over
entry and exit'3 1 and possibly a violation of federal immigration and
criminal law.' 32 And, the city's repatriation without removal hearings and
orders has a clear effect on the repatriated juveniles' future prospects for
re-entry into the United States. 133 In this way, the city of San Francisco
directly (and negatively) burdens other cities and states, and the national
polity as a whole, by obscuring critical factors necessary for immigration
control. Thus, in this highly unusual circumstance-where a city is
actually removing individuals out of the country-the De Canas
prohibition of sub-federal laws that "regulate immigration" invalidates
the repatriation policy. Unless we accept Professor Peter Spiro's
provocative thesis that states-and, in this case, municipalities-have
indeed become cognizable demi-sovereignties, 134  the repatriation
program had to be stopped. Even though we have taken steps towards
increased direct sub-federal governmental engagement with foreign and
international entities in areas such as environmental regulation,' 35 we are
not at the point-and neither should we be-when sub-federal entities
can engage in admission and deportation on their own terms.
But, I read LAWA to be of a different ilk than the repatriation policy.
The Ninth Circuit noted when it upheld LAWA, that IRCA only
131. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-57 (setting forth a preemption framework for state
immigration laws, wherein the first category of invalid state laws regulate immigration as
such).
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(l)(A) (West 2010) (criminalizing concealing and
transporting persons known to be unlawfully present).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(9)(A) (repealed 1952) (containing time bars to admissibility for
arriving aliens with prior order of removal).
134. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35
VAJ. INT'L L. 121 (1995).
135. See, e.g., Cindy Holden, Ca. Gov. Schwarznegger Urges World Leaders to
Embrace Subnational Leadership in Climate Change Fight, CAL. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 16,
2009, available at http://californianewswire.com/2009/12/16/CNW6312_205703.php;
see also Gently Does It: Mexico and America, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2009 ("One
reason is that relations have grown so intense and complex that they are no longer
managed only through the respective governments. Arturo Sarukhin, Mexico's
ambassador in Washington, is pleased by the multiplication of actors in the relationship:
'mayors, governors, universities, chambers of commerce, and not just the foreign
ministry.' Andrew Selee, director of the Mexico Institute at Washington's Woodrow
Wilson International Centre for Scholars, says it has become commonplace for officials
in nearly every federal agency to pick up the phone and chat directly to their Mexican
counterparts.").
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
preempts states and local laws that impose civil or criminal sanctions. 36
In this case, LAWA compels business license revocation, which IRCA
itself expressly excluded from what states and local governments may
not do. LAWA does not directly deal with issues of admission or
removal. A court can render a decision based on statutory interpretation
of the express terms of the law, in a context wherein no individual is
allowed entry or exit from the United States.
The harder cases are ones like the recently preliminary enjoined
Arizona law provisions that give broad powers to local law enforcement
regarding the apprehension and prosecution of noncitizens suspected of
being unlawfully present,' 37 as well as the Farmer's Branch local housing
ordinance. But even with these ordinances, my concern is not with the
non-uniformity that they create; rather it is that they likely violate other
constitutional dictates meant to protect individual liberties and maintain
equality.
138
Shepherd: I grant that one could try to distinguish all of these
situations. Yet, the situations we discussed-city repatriation, LAWA,
rental ban and enhanced local police powers-are all likely to have some
attenuated effect on entry and exit and terms and conditions of a
noncitizen's residence in the United States.
Locke: I agree that sanctuary policies and non-rental policies have an
attenuated effect on immigration. Despite this relationship, however, I
think we would agree that there is a qualitative difference between
indirectly or marginally influencing decisions to remain in or leave the
country and directly admitting or removing individuals. If we do not
recognize a legally cognizable line between those positions, then literally
every sub-federal policy that even minimally affects or includes non-
citizens is invalid.
Shepherd: De Canas addresses precisely this concern. That case
recognized that of course, not every law that affects non-citizens
constitutes immigration regulation. 39 In setting up the three tests,
however, De Canas takes a strong preemptive strike against a sub-federal
policy that has been strategically labeled a "local law" that is purported
to be historically based on traditional local police powers but is in fact
regulating immigration law.' 40 Even in the federalism context outside of
136. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct 3498.
137. United States v. Arizona, No. 10-1413, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 2926157 at *9-10,
"19-20 (D. Ariz. Jul. 28, 2010).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 163-178 (arguing that due process and equal
protection paradigms should be applied to the immigrant and immigration-related
context).
139. 424 U.S. at 355.
140. Id. at 361 n.9.
[Vol. 55:16831710
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
immigration law, the Supreme Court has recognized the near
impossibility of separating the "traditional" areas of local governance
from areas of federal control. 141
Locke: It is difficult to cleanly separate federal and sub-federal
provinces, and further, decisions regarding the viability of laws should
not hinge on how the law is labeled. But, my point is that from the
perspective of unanimity-or, as you put it, avoiding a "patchwork"-I
remain convinced that the only persuasive claim to unanimity adheres to
sub-federal policies, like San Francisco's abandoned repatriation
program, that actually affect entry and removal. Beyond that context-
when we're discussing laws that may affect non-citizens-I question
how different the immigration context is from other areas of concurrent
federal and sub-federal regulation that are highly variegated.
Shepherd: Any attempt to cabin acceptable immigration preemption
claims to "entry/exit" situations is similarly not easy to achieve. True,
non-cooperation and non-dissemination policies do not physically
transport persons in or out of the country, but they nevertheless affect the
conditions in which a noncitizen can reside in the United States. As
Takahashi teaches, domestic laws that affect how, where, and under what
circumstances a non-citizen may reside within a sub-federal jurisdiction
should also be considered immigration regulations.1 42 De Canas may
have explained that not every law that affects noncitizens should
constitute immigration regulation, 43 but in my view, sanctuary policies
come close to blurring the line between local governance of local matters
and local interference with immigration regulation. Any measure-
whether inclusionary or exclusionary-could have some marginal effect
on attracting or deterring immigration. After LAWA and SB 1070 went
into effect, for instance, many reported the out-migration of noncitizens
from Arizona. 44 That result is not at all surprising, given that then-
Governor Napolitano didn't shy away from noting that the purpose of
LAWA was to "take strong action to discourage the further flow of
illegal immigration through our state."'
145
141. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(abandoning the categorical protection of state autonomy developed in Nat'l League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which argued that areas of "traditional" state
control were immune from federal regulation under the commerce clause).
142. 334 U.S. at 422 (invalidating a law that prohibited those persons who were
ineligible for citizenship from obtaining a fishing license).
143. 424 U.S. at 355.
144. Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Seeing Signs of Flight by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2008, at A13.
145. Press Release, Governor Signs Employer Sanctions Bill (July 2, 2007), available
at http://www.formi9.com/news/ArizonaBillSigned.pdf.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
Locke: Undoubtedly, under plausible interpretations of De Canas
and Takahashi, LAWA could be found unconstitutional if a court gives
weight to Napolitano's statement. But, to do so would be to concede that
any state and local measure affecting immigrants should be invalidated
as encouraging or discouraging undocumented migration. And, it begs
the question whether the constitutional viability of any sub-federal law
should turn on whether the enacting executive was foolhardy enough to
detail a desire to control immigration flows.
More broadly, I think that the Takahashi/De Canas definitional
problem you raise is clear evidence that the Supreme Court itself has
woefully under-theorized the definition of "immigration regulation."
Early cases establishing broad immigration authority for the federal
government concentrated on issues of entry and removal.1 46 Later cases
like Takahashi and Graham v. Richardson147 (if we understand Graham
to be an immigration case rather than a welfare case) elasticized the
definition of "immigration" rather than focusing on entry and removal.
Shepherd: This definition may be elastic but it need not be
ambiguous. A line must be drawn between federal and state/local laws
concerning immigration regulation. And this may be accomplished under
either express, conflict, or field preemption approaches. Under either an
analytic framework that relies on federal exclusivity in immigration
matters, or one that maintains a presumption against preemption on
immigration matters, the federal government could accomplish similar
goals. Under the former, courts would invalidate noncooperation and
other sanctuary policies even in the absence of federal action. In the
latter, courts could still invalidate sanctuary policies but only if Congress
enacted specific legislation. Either way, courts would get to the same
result.
Locke: Yes, courts may reach the same conclusion but I prefer that
courts rely more on the express preemption framework to strike down
laws that are preempted and utilize less the implied preemption
approach.
The advantage I see in a doctrine that focuses solely on express
preemption is that it holds open the possibility of localities with high
immigrant populations-for example, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
New York-making life easier for undocumented persons and their
families as long as Congress doesn't act. More generally, I see great
146. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589 (upholding Chinese Exclusion Act and
barring re-entry of Chinese citizen); See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893) (upholding removal procedures of Chinese Exclusion Act).
147. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
value in forcing Congress to react to sub-federal lawmaking. 48 First,
sanctuary and other non-cooperation ordinances may send a clear
message to local law enforcement officials of the prevailing majoritarian
will of their communities; 149 those officials may not be legally prevented
from voluntary disclosure, but the city can announce to them that such
reporting is frowned upon by the community they serve. Second,
preserving the ability of sub-federal entities to enact a variety of
immigrant-related legislation pressures the federal government during its
debate of comprehensive immigration overhaul to engage the various
sub-federal policies.150 As Professor Heather Gerken notes, in engaging
sub-federal policies, Congress will either have to expressly override,
tolerate, or adopt the sub-federal policy preference.' 51 If we start from the
premise that the federal government already has the constitutional power
to enact some of the most restrictive of the current array of sub-federal
policies-and, in fact, has done so in the past-then some progress can
come out of possibilities of Congress potentially accounting for the
benefits of less antagonistic, or openly inclusive, sub-federal policies.
Remember that it was then-Governor of Arizona, now-Department of
Homeland Security Secretary, Napolitano who signed LAWA into law,
based significantly on this legislation-forcing principle. She stated,
"[b]ecause of Congress' failure to act, states like Arizona have no choice
but to take action. . . . I renew my call to Congress to enact
comprehensive immigration reform legislation."
'1 52
Importantly, I want to clarify that I'm not wedded to a court ruling
that LAWA is non-preempted. Rather, I am more concerned with the
method of adjudication and the understanding of the case within the De
Canas framework. As a judicial approach, I am more at peace when
courts engage in statutory interpretation to determine actual conflict
between state and federal law, than I am when courts defer to nebulous
notions of federal exclusivity in the federal plenary power framework to
reach their decision. 153 Focusing solely on express preemption forces
148. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L. J. 1256, 1263 (2009) (developing an account of the ways in which states
"playing the role of federal servant can also resist federal mandates, the ways in which
integration-and not just autonomy-can empower states to challenge federal authority").
149. See generally, Pham, supra note 56, at 1398-99.
150. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 146, at 1287.
151. Id.
152. Signing Statement and Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor of Arizona, to Jim
Weirs, Speaker of the House, Arizona House of Representatives, (July 2, 2007), available
at www.formi9.com/news/ArizonaBillSigned.pdf.
153. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUp. CT. REV.
175, 208 (2000); See also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
positive lawmaking at the federal level, ensuring that at least one
policymaking body has considered the benefits and burdens of any
particular course of action.
Concentrating on narrowly proscribed conflicts between laws also
has the benefit of helping prioritize legislative goals. Presumably, those
sub-federal enactments that truly endanger the functioning of the several
states as one nation will receive legislative priority.
B. Inclusionary and Exclusionary Measures
Shepherd: What you are suggesting, however, is a paradigm shift in
federal preemption jurisprudence. As Professor Michael Olivas noted,
the legal tendency to preempt state and local legislation that attempt to
legislate immigration or conflict with federal immigration law and policy
promotes uniformity across the borders.154 As I explained earlier, there is
tremendous value to having consistency in the ways in which immigrants
are not only admitted and removed but also treated within the U.S.
polity. Otherwise, we would create zones or pockets in the United States
where some cities or even states are anti-immigrants and others that are
more welcoming.'55
Locke: Yes, that is a possible consequence of the shift I am
proposing. First, I am not certain why defined zones or pockets are
necessarily undesirable. And even if we agreed that such an outcome was
normatively undesirable, other constitutional and statutory restrictions
may forestall significant deviations between different regions. Second,
and perhaps more fundamentally, I simply don't think we can hold on to
broad notions of the federal exclusivity principle any longer. I know
Professor Michael Olivas has persuasively argued that it's the "devil we
know," and preferable to other available modes of adjudicating these
sub-federal laws. 156 However, my own view is that the doctrine is ill-
L. REv. 767, 771-73 (1994) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause only covers express and
conflict preemption and that beyond those parameters, preemption becomes an exercise
of judicial discretion).
154. Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances:
Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27,
53 (2007) ("We certainly do not want and cannot tolerate hundreds [of immigration
policies], allowing liberal Santa Fe, New Mexico to carve out a 'sanctuary' while
Hazelton, Pennsylvania or Norcross, Georgia get to run every bilingual speaker or dark-
complexioned person out of town after sundown."); Michael A. Olivas, Preempting
Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L
L. 217, 236 (1994) ("[Pjreemption, for all its detriments and foolish inconsistencies, is
the devil we know. A postmoder state cannot coexist with medieval constructs.").
155. See Olivas, supra note 152, at 53; Olivas, supra note 152, at 236.
156. Olivas, Preempting Preemption, supra note 152, at 236.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
fitted to contemporary realities of the interaction between federal and
sub-federal entities with regards to immigrants.' 57 Preemption based on
federal exclusivity may be the devil we know, but familiarity doesn't
make it any less of a devil. In recent years, preemption has been the
sword wielded just as much by immigration restrictionists to challenge
immigrant-friendly laws, as it has been by immigrant advocates to
challenge unfriendly ones. Doctrinally, the foreign policy rationales for
federal exclusivity weaken when the legislative focus strays from
decisions of entry and exit. The sanctuary ordinances are only concerned
with those already in the country and within a city-regardless of their
method of entry. They cannot increase or decrease visa allotments, nor
can they prevent federal authorities, acting with their own resources and
investigative information, from capturing, detaining, or deporting
unlawfully present immigrants. As then-Secretary of Homeland Security
Michael Chertoff in testimony in front of the House Homeland Security
Committee clarified, "I'm not aware of any city, although I may be
wrong, that actually interferes with our ability to enforce the law."', 58
The other liability with heavy reliance on federal exclusivity
challenges to immigrant-related sub-federal lawmaking is the absence of
a strong judicial check. At least courts have to evaluate the due process
and equal protection concerns of restrictive state and local legislation. No
such backstop exists for federal lawmaking. Federal immigration policies
are much more sticky than sub-federal ones, and continued genuflection
to broad versions of federal immigration exclusivity reify the wide-
latitude courts provide the federal government.
Shepherd: I have faith that federal courts are, as they have done in
the past, best able to balance the competing tensions between granting
deference to the federal government on immigration matters on the one
hand and recognizing traditional state police powers on the other hand.
To address your other point, while it may be true that ICE may enter
a state or local jurisdiction at any time to enforce the INA, there is no
doubt that localities that choose to not cooperate with federal officials
arguably make it more difficult for ICE to remove unauthorized
immigrants from the country. Such fragmentation of immigration
regulation is problematic not only from a constitutional perspective but
from a public policy view as well. Some states will be burdened with the
higher costs associated with the migration of noncitizens into their
157. Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 576-80 (2008).
158. Alex Koppelman, Congress to New York (and Chicago and L.A.): Drop Dead,
SALON.COM (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature-
/2007/10/04/sanctuary.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
borders, including increased use of hospitals, schools and other services.
Other states may experience heightened anti-immigrant environments
that could be conducive to discriminatory treatment of racialized
noncitizens. As Professor Michael Wishnie argued, devolving the
exclusive federal immigration power historically facilitated state-
sanctioned discrimination against immigrants. 59 Additionally, if the
exclusionary ordinances enacted in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, 160 and
Farmers Branch, Texas, 161 are any indication, the laws typically target
racialized noncitizens, and specifically, Latinos. Professor Huyen Pham
pointed out, for instance, that state and local anti-immigrant laws have
had discriminatory impact on Latinos who found themselves having to
prove their citizenship and legal status frequently in places where such
laws have been enacted. 1
62
Locke: I am definitely concerned, based on my own notions of
justice and humanity, about the rise of several Arizonas and Farmers
Branches. Even though some such laws were struck down, federal courts
elsewhere have upheld similarly restrictive ordinances meant to drive out
undocumented persons. I have serious due process, equal protection, and
fourth amendment concerns with these types of laws that devolve
immigration status determinations, in the first instance, to private parties
or local officials. In enacting LAWA, Governor Napolitano herself noted
that one of the problems with the bill was the "lack [of] an
antidiscrimination clause to ensure that it is enforced in a fair and non-
discriminatory manner."'163 The most significant concern with these laws
is the one you rightly identify: the probability of racial profiling in the
jurisdictions that enact these laws. The self-proclaimed "America's
Sheriff," Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County, Arizona, is already the subject
of multiple racial profiling lawsuits,164 as citizens and legal residents of
Latin American descent continue to complain of persecution for "crimes"
159. See Michael Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 493 (2001).
160. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-13 § 7(b)l(g) (2006); Illegal Immigration
Relief Act Ordinance, HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 200-18 (2006).
161. FARMERS BRANCH, Tx., ORDINANCE 2952 (2008).
162. Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1148-49
(2009) (explaining that although "moving border laws ... do not single out any particular
ethnic or racial group," the contexts in which they were passed demonstrated that they
were enacted to target Latinos).
163. Press Release, Governor Signs Employer Sanctions Bill (July 2, 2007), available
at http://www.formi9.com/news/ArizonaBillSigned.pdf.
164. See, e.g., Randy James, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, TIMES.COM (Oct. 13, 2009), available
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1929920,00.html.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
like "driving while brown." 165 Arizona's most recent enactment allowing
local apprehension and prosecution based on suspected unlawful status
magnifies these concerns.
But, the fact that this tragic likelihood exists is a good policy reason
to oppose such enactments; it doesn't, however, answer the question
whether such enactments are unconstitutional as a function of the
division of powers between federal and sub-federal governments.
Moreover, this is exactly why I argued earlier that Takahashi and
Graham are better understood as due process or equal protection cases;
the more we ingrain those rights-based concerns into our immigration
jurisprudence, the less likely we are to produce discriminatory results.
Shepherd: Given the Court's demonstrated reluctance to expand the
classes of persons receiving heightened protection under the equal
protection clause, and the long-established exceptionalism attendant to
immigration cases, I am not optimistic that the doctrinal change you
suggest will occur any time soon. Taking the jurisprudential framework
as we find it today, part of my hesitation with recognizing the validity of
sanctuary policies under the preemption doctrine is that I worry that it
would acknowledge the validity of local exclusionary laws designed to
remove noncitizens. It strikes me that allowing inclusionary measures to
survive the preemption doctrine requires similar treatment of
exclusionary laws. It's the "one can't have your cake and eat it too"
argument. Although they serve distinct functions, they share the same
underlying principle that a local government has authority to pass laws
that come close to immigration regulation.
Locke: Based on my own preferences, I would like to believe that
integrationist policies can be legally distinguished from exclusionary
policies, with the former being upheld and the latter struck down. I have
some affinity for arguments against exclusionary policies-rental
ordinances and the like-based on freedom of movement principles
66
and due process concerns related to private actors inquiring about
immigration status. And, arguably, exclusionary policies export the
externalities of undocumented immigration-or immigration generally-
to other jurisdictions, whereas inclusionary and integrationist policies
internalize the cost.
Shepherd: But even here, inclusionary practices by localities
arguably also create negative externalities by incentivizing continued
165. Indeed, a recent ordinance enacted on Long Island, New York, which aims to
prohibit solicitation of day labor work, has been dubbed a law against "waving while
Latino." Robin Finn, Town Divides Over Law Aimed at Day Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 2009, at MB I.
166. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
unlawful presence within the country and thereby increasing enforcement
and adjudication costs. I don't think you can really differentiate between
inclusionary and exclusionary policies on that basis.
Locke: So, you may be right; despite my preferences, I may have to
accept some exclusionary policies if I want to justify inclusionary sub-
federal policies. At least on the broad question of whether one or the
other affects undocumented migration, it's hard to distinguish between
them. But, as I've tried to convince you throughout our discussion, the
larger systemic response-admittedly a long-term project-is to
challenge the exclusionary policies through due process, equal
protection, and statutory civil rights provisions well-established in areas
outside the treatment of non-citizens. Sub-federal entities seeking to
enact restrictive legislation are likely to run afoul of separate
constitutional and civil rights mandates. The threat of such civil liability
itself may deter the proliferation of such enactments. Otherwise, the
concerns occasioned can be fought in policy battles at the local level as
well as the national level. Part of the reason Congress didn't pass
proposed federal laws to coerce more sub-federal cooperation in
immigration enforcement was the position taken by local police chiefs in
a joint statement.167 They argued that mandated local immigration
regulation impeded local law enforcement's ability to work with certain
communities and adequately protect the safety of citizens and non-
citizens alike. 68 Presumably these are influential local law enforcement
officials who would make the same claims to their respective mayors and
city councils during local debates on these same issues.
Shepherd: So recognize their validity under the preemption doctrine
but arguably strike them down under due process or equal protection?
Although you are correct that discriminatory laws that target racialized
noncitizens relate more to questions of equal protection and due process,
the tests for recognizing violations under both, particularly equal
protection are difficult to meet. Importantly, the fact that racial
discrimination might occur at the state and local level as a result of the
conferral of shared immigration regulation, in my view, does support the
argument of ensuring that immigration regulation continues to be the
exclusive province of the federal government. It all goes back to assuring
167. Major Cities Chiefs of Police, Immigration Committee, Recommendations for
Enforcement of Immigration Laws by Local Police Agencies 9 (2006) (arguing that the
"decision to enter [immigration] enforcement should be left to the local government and
not mandated or forced upon them by the federal government through the threat of
sanctions or the withholding of existing police assistance funding"); See also Pham,
supra note 56, at 1399-1400 ("Police chiefs and police associations have been some of
the strongest advocates of non-cooperation laws because of public safety concerns.").
168. Pham, supra note 56, at 1399-1400.
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
consistent treatment of noncitizens that is more easily achieved from a
top-down, federal approach.
Even more worrisome to me than the theoretical notion that the
"bad" comes with the "good" if we resolve the preemption questions as
you would, is the on-the-ground possibility that restrictionism and anti-
immigrant sentiment will soon become the dominant trend. Because I
consider myself an immigrant advocate, and one concerned about the
restrictionist bent of many communities, I am wary of supporting sub-
federal legislation: for every city of refuge there will be a city signing a
287(g) memorandum; for every state granting in-state tuition benefits
regardless of citizenship status, there will be one that enacts a legal
workers act.
Locke: One answer is to trust that as a matter of practicality and
economic rationality, jurisdictions that attempt exclusionary or
enforcement measures will find them to be bad policy and rescind them.
By no means conclusive, some evidence from cities that have repealed
restrictive measures have found them to be too costly,169 or have found
no money to enforce their enforcement goals, suggests that this could be
the case.170 The Migration Policy Institute's 2008 Report on Regulating
Immigration at the State Level noted some significant trends. First, it
found that states passing legislation expanding immigrant rights were
enacted at a higher rate than bills contracting rights, regulating
employment, or related to enforcement. 71 Second, it found that a
substantial part of the contracting, employment, and enforcement
legislation originated in states that are not traditional immigrant-
receiving states, and are facing their first significant influx of non-
citizens.17 2 The first finding suggests that a "race to the top" could occur
rather than a "race to the bottom." The second finding may be even more
significant. It suggests that state and local restrictionism may be a time-
bound reaction-one that is destined to change when those jurisdictions
caught off-guard by an increasing immigrant population and a declining
economy become accustomed to outsiders in their community. Indeed,
169. Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007.
170. Cameron McWhirter, State's Strict Immigration Law Goes Unenforced, THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Jan. 25, 2009.
171. CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, ET. AL, REGULATING IMMIGRATION AT THE STATE LEVEL:
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE DATABASE OF 2007 STATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND THE
METHODOLOGY 3 (2008), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub-
/statelaws home.cfm. Note that the report used data from state enactments, not local
legislation.
172. Id. at 3-4.
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
the rate of cultural change can be politically de-stabilizing when it
accelerates for the first time. 173
Shepherd: I hope that you are right. But we both also know that these
reactionary laws have occurred in the past and at great costs. Consider
for instance the alien land laws of the early 1920s when western states
passed laws that restricted the ability of noncitizens who were ineligible
for citizenship to own property. 174 These laws were targeted at Japanese.
As Professor Keith Aoki has noted, there was a correlation between these
laws and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War 11.175 I
am not arguing that the current local anti-immigrant laws will lead to
such appalling consequences but I am suggesting that thinking of these
laws as single reactionary legislation addressed at cultural change might
foster a climate of racial discrimination against noncitizens, particularly
Latinos. Tragic instances in places such as Long Island, New York,
where exclusionary laws have been enacted 76 and Latinos have been
assaulted and harassed 77 highlight this correlation. The "Save our State"
campaign supporting California's Proposition 187 in the mid-1990's
gave social sanction to an anti-immigrant ethos.
178
Locke: But history also shows that the federal government has not
entirely been uniformly better for immigrants. Although it is true that in
the absence of federal action, the most restrictive and harshest of state
and local legislation would be invalidated under a federal exclusivity
framework, once the federal government acts, it also has a proven anti-
immigrant track record. First, the federal government maintained express
racial, ethnic, and national origin exclusions in immigration law long-
after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and even after Brown v.
Board of Education.'79 It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that those
173. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation & the
Pursuit of Cultural Cohesion, 77 CINC. L. REv. 1441, 1451-56 (2009).
174. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property,
Race and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. _ (2010 forthcoming) (examining the alien
land laws that were intended to deprive Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans of
land ownership).
175. See Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land
Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REv. 37, 66-68 (1998).
176. See Finn, supra note 163.
177. See Anne Barnard, Assault on Latinos Spur Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at
Al (discussing a recent U.S. Attorney investigation of hate crimes committed against
Latinos on Long Island); see also Kirk Semple, A Killing in a Town Where Latinos Sense
Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at A25 (reporting the killing of an Ecuadorian man).
178. See Kevin Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70
WASH. L. REv. 629 (1995).
179. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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SANCTUARY POLICIES
naked restrictions were excised from the INA. 8 Importantly, those
changes are not compelled by the Constitution; they were instituted
solely as a matter of majoritarian preference, and can be repealed by that
same process. I am not claiming that we will revert to times of outright
racial exclusion, or that such return is politically feasible in 2010, but it
is worth noting that our constitutional order doesn't prevent federal
excess in that regard.
Even if we cabin those nineteenth and twentieth century exclusions
as admissions decisions from a different constitutional era, recent federal
activity doesn't inspire hope either. The diversity lottery for admission
into the country specifically benefits individuals from certain world
regions. The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(NSEERS) program requires mandatory registration of non-citizens from
Arab and Muslim countries, and monitoring of their residency by federal
authorities.181 The federal government restricts public assistance to
classes of non-citizens,' 82 and in 1996 authorized states to do so, 83 even
in the face of Supreme Court precedent disallowing the same.' 84 In
addition, although state laws providing in-state tuition benefits to
undocumented persons are both normatively desirable and
constitutionally valid, 85  federal bans on undocumented work
authorization prevent states from capturing the economic benefits of
highly educated undocumented persons. Even prior to 1996, others have
cautioned immigrant-advocates from excessive reliance on federal
plenary power strategies.' 
86
Shepherd: I think we both agree that both federal and state
governments have proven themselves to be at times hostile to immigrants
180. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Gabriel J.
Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279 (1996).
181. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, available at http://www.ice.gov-
/pi/specialregistration/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
182. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding federal alienage distinctions
for Medicare against equal protection challenges).
183. Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 42, U.S.C.)
184. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382 (striking down state alienage distinctions for
welfare benefits on both equal protection and preemption grounds); Soskin v. Reinertson,
353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004); Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 96 F.2d 418 (1st Cir.
2001).
185. See Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances, supra note 152, at
53.
186. See Evangeline G. Abriel, Rethinking Preemption for Purposes of Aliens and
Public Benefits, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1597, 1625-30 (1995).
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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
and, other times, welcoming of them. The issues we are discussing
now-sub-federal immigration regulation in general and sanctuary laws
in particular-are without question part of the overall question of how
the preemption and other doctrines such as due process and equal
protection can better respond to the fundamental reality noted by you and
Professor Cristina Rodriguez: whether the federal government likes it or
not, states and local governments are participating in some way in
immigration regulation, broadly defined. But this is not a new reality;
states and localities have always been the front lines of dealing with
immigrants as residents. The country's first immigration laws were state
and local laws.' 87 Yet, the fact is that once the federal government
robustly entered the field, states and localities were relieved of the need
to individually and separately regulate entry. National standards dictate
entries at airports and borders; national standards dictate visa allowances
and procedures for removal. Similarly, one national standard should
dictate judicial understanding of immigrant-related lawmaking.
IV. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 AND COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM
Locke: You may get your wish for national standards if the current
presidential administration's promise of comprehensive federal
immigration reform becomes a reality. To the extent that such a federal
proposal is truly comprehensive, my concern regarding judicial decision-
making based on plenary power rationales is mitigated. The more
expansive the federal regulation, the more likely it is that a court will
assess sub-federal lawmaking affecting non-citizens-sanctuary policies
as well as business penalties-under an express preemption framework.
But a systemic response to the proliferation of restrictive regulation
is that a federal exclusivity response may not be better for immigrants.
Although in the short run it would require invalidation of the LAWAs
and Hazelton ordinances-and perhaps non-cooperation or sanctuary
laws-in the long run its anybody's guess as to whether the federal
government would accomplish the same restrictive or exclusionary goals
on a national level. If we accept Professor Wishnie's highly persuasive
argument that many of the sub-federal provisions enacted to help enforce
federal immigration law are impliedly preempted, 188 the underlying
corollary has to be that Congress could expressly provide for such
cooperation, or coerce it through spending provisions. In fact, Congress
has already attempted the coercive compliance tack twice in recent years,
187. See Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-
1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
188. Wishnie, supra note 157, at 567.
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SANCTUAR YPOLICIES
both attempts failing to pass floor votes. 189 So far, the consistent failure
of these measures suggests that there is insufficient political will to
strong-arm states and localities into participating in federal schemes.
Shepherd: Alternatively, it could also suggest that less overt methods
of securing compliance-for example, voluntary 287(g) agreements and
inclusion of immigration data on the NCIC database' 9 -accomplish
many of the same enforcement goals without the attendant political
liabilities. But, Congress, in other circumstances has been able to gather
the political will to pass national legislation that aids in its immigration
enforcement capabilities. The San Francisco "don't tell" policy at issue
here is a good example; federal law bars the city from preventing
voluntary dissemination of immigrant status information.
Locke: Assuming Congress has the political will and support to
preempt sanctuary laws, it may choose to undertake three options with
respect to 8 U.S.C. § 1373. The first is that it can opt to leave the law as
is. The second approach is to pass a law that would expressly preempt
sanctuary or non-cooperation laws. The third possible approach is for
Congress to recognize some areas where states and local governments
may choose to participate in exchange for economic incentives.
Shepherd: I agree that any of these three options will explicitly
demonstrate Congress's intent to prohibit state and local governments
from enacting sanctuary policies. Indeed, until it does, the validity of
sanctuary laws such as San Francisco's will be left open for the courts to
decide under the current preemption framework we've discussed.
CONCLUSION
For more than twenty years, San Francisco's sanctuary ordinance has
provided a safe haven for undocumented immigrants in the city. The
recent amendment to the ordinance, which pushes the boundaries of what
a municipality may do with respect to the treatment of noncitizens in the
U.S., threatens to undermine two decades of efforts to ensure that
189. See, e.g., Accountability in Enforcing Immigration Laws Act of 2007, H.R. 3531,
10th Cong. (2007) (expressly authorizing sub-federal law enforcement officials to
enforce immigration provisions related to unlawful presence and providing financial
disincentives to noncooperating jurisdictions); Clear Law Enforcement Act of 2005, H.R.
3137, 109th Cong. (2005) (authorizing sub-federal law enforcement officials to
apprehend unlawfully present aliens and allowing federal grants to cooperating
jurisdictions).
190. Comment, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary
Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime Information Center
Database, 97 CAL. L. REV. 567, 583-91 (2009).
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1724 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1683
immigrants continue to be part of the San Francisco community despite
their status.
San Francisco's policy represents a growing trend in the United
States of places that aim to offer protection to undocumented immigrants
from removal from the United States, but it is also part of broader efforts
to deploy state and local governmental powers to participate in
immigration regulation. The key, as we discussed above, is striking the
right balance between what constitutes federal immigration law and state
and local laws. Addressing this tension requires, at minimum, a closer
examination of the preemption doctrine to consider whether it ought to
create more space for states and local governments to participate in the
regulation of immigration law.
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